

FROM NOBLE KNIGHTS TO POLISH WARRIORS? RECONFIGURATIONS OF MASCULINITIES AND FEMININITIES IN POLISH REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE AND DURING THE TIMES OF PARTITION

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The period between the first partition of Poland in 1772 and the participation of Polish soldiers in Napoleonic warfare in the ranks of the Polish Legions at the end of the 18th and at the beginning of the 19th century (until the foundation of the Duchy of Warsaw in 1807) has been crucial for the reshaping not only of a certain sense of Polish citizenship but also for a new definition of gender roles in Polish society. The permanent warfare and the close connection between a revolutionary attitude of national uprising and a new concept of citizenship no longer dependent on a noble origin but on civil or military service for the “fatherland in distress” which meant a new notion of soldiership. On the one hand one can observe a development quite similar to experiences in Western Europe, i.e. the pushing aside of women from the public sphere as a consequence of the ever closer connection between military duties and receiving political rights. On the other hand, the state of emergency during the uprisings and the national struggle for independence opened new opportunities for female agency. Quite an important role played also the legacy of the reshaping of gender roles in the late Republic of Nobles, when the basic layers of citizenship had been renegotiated. Polish political reformers stressed the role of military virtue but they also focussed on the importance of the future soldier’s education that almost without exceptions they saw lying in the hand of the mothers¹. Unlike in other European countries, in the Polish lands during this period the family received special attention as a place of public education and as one of the most important

¹ B. Lorence-Kot, *Child-rearing and reform: a study of the nobility on eighteenth-century Poland*, Westport London 1985.

pillars of the state and society – since the public institutions that used to function in the developing civil societies and nation states of Western Europe were replaced in the Polish case by a society that was still organized on informal kinship relations.

This article takes a gendered approach in order to investigate the changes in the Polish political discourse around 1800. It applies a relational gender model that focuses on the ascriptions of gender roles to certain areas of societal and state activities. When we speak about the history of masculinity we should always keep in mind that very different kinds of masculinities² were at stake in the processes of state – and nation-building during the era of revolutionary warfare. We have to historicize the conceptions of masculinity and also femininity in order to understand how neatly these concepts were intertwined with the construction of national or other collective identities. By comparing different kinds of revolutionary warfare and the subsequent attempts of state-building and its respective prerequisites we can discover that notions of masculinity (and femininity) always are conditioned by different historical contexts³. This remark seems the more important to me as the French example of the intersection of revolutionary upheaval and promoting civic rights to the male part of the society as one important step of the third estate's emancipation from the former social and political order often is represented as a kind of master narrative for societies change from the ancient regime to “modernity”⁴. In this view a close connection is drawn between the devaluation of the monarchy and the privileged nobility by ascribing to them traits of effeminacy and unmanliness on the one hand and the construction of the citizen-soldier characterized by manly virtues on the other hand. In an apparently “natural” manner women in this way were excluded from

² With good cause recent introductions into the field of masculinity studies are speaking masculinities in the plural form, *vide e.g.* J. Martschukat, O. Stieglitz, *Geschichte der Männlichkeiten*, Frankfurt/Main 2008.

³ *Masculinities in politics and war. Gendering modern history*, eds. S. Dudink, K. Hagemann, J. Tosh, Manchester, New York 2004; *Gender, War, and Politics: transatlantic perspectives*, eds. K. Hagemann, G. Mettele, J. Rendall, Basingstoke et al. 2010; A. Barańska, *Wpływ powstań na ewolucję ról społecznych kobiet*, [in:] *Polskie powstania narodowe na tle przemian europejskich w XIX wieku*, ed. ead., W. Matwiejczyk, J. Ziołek, Lublin 2001, p. 275–288.

⁴ C. Opitz, *Aufklärung der Geschlechter, Revolution der Geschlechterordnung. Studien zur Politik – und Kulturgeschichte des 18. Jahrhunderts*, Münster 2002; D.Y. Kaddish, *Politicizing Gender: narrative strategies in the aftermath of the French Revolution*, New Brunswick 1991; A.F. Timm, J.A. Sanborn, *Gender, Sex and the Shaping of Modern Europe: a history from the French Revolution to the present day*, Oxford 2007, p. 17–53; A.K. Smart, *Citoyennes: women and the ideal of citizenship in eighteenth-century France*, Newark, Md. 2011.

the new political order. But the gendered structure of modern societies is a lot more complex than this bipartite picture seems to insinuate. In my article I will have a look at a part of Europe where new gender relations developed out of a different historical setting and where discussions about a new society were not necessarily (or at least not exclusively) dominated by the notion of western bourgeois citizenship. In the article first and foremost noble masculinities will be scrutinized. This seems sensible for two reasons. Firstly Polish society in the 18th century was comprised of a relatively high percentage of people of noble origin (compared to the rest of Europe) or about 8 to 15 percent. Discussions about social transformations during the 18th century very often were focussing on this part of the society. Secondly, we still know very little about gender discourses in the historical contexts of peasants and townsmen during that time.

I am going to concentrate on two periods of Polish history in the times of European revolutionary warfare at the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th century. In a first step I will discuss the relationship between patriotic mobilization and the existing respectively new gender order during the reform debates in the late Polish-Lithuanian Republic and during the Kościuszko uprising of 1794. After that I will compare this first period with changes in gender order and the concepts of citizenship which had arisen after the period of permanent warfare in the Polish Legions and the establishment of the Duchy of Warsaw. The years between 1792 and 1815 meant a period of military mass mobilization and radical social and political change in both European and Polish history⁵. Not only since the passing of the Constitution in May 1791 had new concepts of Polish citizenship been developed⁶. Discussions about political rights and military and civilian duties had lasted since decades⁷. But the shock of the second partition in 1793 as well as the acquaintance with the revolutionary events in France since 1789 accelerated political and social transformations and inter-

⁵ J. Czubyty, *Zasada „dwóch sumień”. Normy postępowanie i granice kompromisu politycznego Polaków w sytuacji wyboru (1795–1815)*, Warszawa 2005.

⁶ A. Grześkowiak-Krwawicz, *O formę rządu czy o rząd dusz? Publicystyka polityczna Sejmu Czteroletniego*, Warszawa 2000; M.G. Müller, *Adel und Elitenwandel in Ostmitteleuropa. Fragen an die polnische Adelsgeschichte im ausgehenden 18. und 19. Jahrhundert*, „Zeitschrift für Ostmitteleuropa-Forschung”, 2002, vol. 50, no. 4, p. 497–513, here 503 ff; Ł. Kądziała, *Od konstytucji do insurekcji. Studia nad dziejami Rzeczypospolitej w latach 1791–1794*, Warszawa 2011, p. 13–55.

⁷ J.K. Hoensch, *Sozialverfassung und politische Reform. Polen im vorrevolutionären Zeitalter*, Köln–Wien 1973; M.G. Müller, *Polen zwischen Preußen und Rußland. Souveränitätskrise und Reformpolitik 1736–1752*, Berlin 1983; J. Michalski, *Z problematyki republikańskiego nurtu polskiej reformatorskiej myśli politycznej w XVIII wieku*, „Kwartalnik Historyczny”, 1983, vol. 90, no. 2, p. 327–338; T. Kizwalter, *O nowoczesności narodu. Przypadek polski*, Warszawa 1999, p. 96 ff.

twined patriotic mobilization for a war of liberation with the question of how to reform the constitutional framework of the Polish-Lithuanian Republic. Keeping in mind the close connection between political and cultural nation-building through warfare on the one hand and the reshaping of gender order on the other, which several times has been demonstrated for European societies in the West, I will ask whether a similar connection can be found while focusing on the Polish society in the given period. In my research I am thus using the military as a kind of a prism for a discourse analysis of Polish political thought. Hence military history of the described period of transition and the social history of the uprisings and military actions are important backdrops of my investigations but not in the centre of interest.

One of the key issues in the reform debates during the last decades of the Polish-Lithuanian Republic was the strengthening of the country's defence⁸. Already in 1717 the "silent parliament" (*sejm niemy*) had in fact decided to introduce a standing army, financed through regular taxation. But this institution never could compete with the huge standing armies of the neighbouring powers (on the eve of the partitions in the 1760s the military forces of Russia comprised of 350,000 soldiers, while those of Austria were about 280,000 and Prussia had about 200,000 while the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth had no more than 16,000 soldiers)⁹. A significant part of the nobility opposed a numerically strong army because it feared the centralization of state power and the reduction of noble privileges. Conclusive evidence of this fear can be seen in the 1768 "Bar Confederation" – a military association of Polish nobles that claimed to protect the catholic faith and Polish independence against Russian influence, which was pinpointed in the reform politics of the last Polish king Stanisław August Poniatowski (1732–1798), who was regarded as only a mere favourite of Russia. With the adherents of the Bar Confederation one important sector of the political spectrum of the Republic can be localized: the conservative *szlachta* that opposed all efforts not only to introduce an effective, centrally organized

⁸ E. Rostworowski, *War and Society in the Noble Republic of Poland-Lithuania in the Eighteenth Century*, [in:] *East Central European Society and War in the Pre-Revolutionary Eighteenth Century*. (= *War and Society in East Central Europe*, Vol. II), eds. B.F. Kiraly, P.F. Sugar, Boulder 1982, p. 165–182; M.G. Müller, *Staat und Heer in der Adelsrepublik Polen im 18. Jahrhundert*, [in:] *Staatsverfassung und Heeresverfassung in der europäischen Geschichte der Neuzeit*, ed. J. Kunisch, Berlin 1986, p. 279–295; C. Kraft, *Polnische militärische Eliten in gesellschaftlichen und politischen Umbruchprozessen 1772–1831*, [in:] *Fremde Herrscher – Fremdes Volk. Inklusions – und Exklusionsfiguren bei Herrschaftswechseln in Europa*, eds. A. Gestrich, H. Schnabel-Schüle, Frankfurt/Main et al. 2006, p. 271–295.

⁹ J. Bardach, B. Leśnodorski, M. Pietrzak, *Historia ustroju i prawa polskiego*, 3rd edition, Warszawa 1996, p. 237.

administration and a powerful army but also to create conditions for broader social mobility and a new basis for political participation. These conservatives regarded as “freedom” first and foremost the freedoms of the noble individual that should not be intruded by state activities¹⁰. It is worth mentioning that the wealthiest nobles (the magnates) were able to afford large “private armies” that could count up to ten thousands of soldiers. Reform-orientated politicians in contrast deplored the lack of a huge standing army which was seen as indispensable for the protection against the imperialist ambitions of the neighbouring countries which had led to the first partition in 1772. Consequently one of the outcomes of the Four Year Sejm (1788–1792) which aimed at reforming the Commonwealth politically and economically after the shock of the first partition was the decision to increase the numbers of soldiers in a standing army to 100,000¹¹.

Whereas the adherence of the conservative *szlachta* to the traditional political system of the Commonwealth had been characterized as “passive republicanism”¹² and criticized for their exploiting the parliament for the interests of their own social stratum¹³, a broad range of more progressive ideas developed in order to adapt to the new social and political realities or for the time being to create them. I will just sketch two concepts of how to reform the system of military defence and how this reform should be connected with a new notion of citizenship in the Republic of Nobles. On the one hand we have the view of wealthy aristocrats as for example the member of the magnate family Adam Kazimierz Czartoryski (1734–1823) who supported the reform policy of the last Polish king and produced a couple of writings for the *Knight's School* (*Szkoła Rycerska*), that had been created in 1765 as one of the pillars of the reform process¹⁴. He deplored the decline of virtues amongst his noble compatriots who obviously had forgotten their sense of responsibility to the country. In his opinion a kind of “re-invention” of nobility should be the remedy for these grievances. He demanded the erection of an academy for young noblemen where they should be taught military as well as civilian subjects: military tactics and the building of fortresses figured on the time-table beside foreign languages and lessons in

¹⁰ A. Grześkowiak-Krwawicz, *Staropolska koncepcja wolności i jej ewolucja w myśli politycznej XVIII w.*, „Kwartalnik Historyczny”, 2006, vol. 113, no. 1, p. 57–83; T. Kizwalter, *O nowoczesności...*, p. 156.

¹¹ A. Grześkowiak-Krwawicz, *O formę rządu...*, p. 96.

¹² *Ibid.*, 378.

¹³ J. Michalski, *op.cit.*, p. 329.

¹⁴ A. Cwer, *Polska wojskowa myśl wychowawcza w latach 1794–1864*, Kielce 2010, p. 56–76; K. Mrozowska, *Szkoła Rycerska Stanisława Augusta Poniatowskiego (1765–1794)*, Wrocław et al. 1961.

law and administration. For him nobility was the precondition for the holding of state offices. His view that noble birth alone did not suffice nobility had to be acquired through education and virtuous behaviour was something new. Nobility was something that was always anew. The claim on political participation, which had been a privilege of each member of the community of noblemen and for a long time was seen as the special feature of the Republic's constitution, now should be subject to the performance of civic duties¹⁵. More radical reformers as for example Hugo Kołłątaj (1750–1812, son of a poor noble family) and Stanisław Staszic (1755–1826, of non-noble descent) rejected this program of elitist education. They preferred a social order in which education, property and above all civil and military service respectively should be the precondition for the acquisition of political citizenship. In the course of time the whole society should be ennobled through the performance of military or civil service. While Czartoryski just wanted to repair the defects of the noble republic's social order, Kołłątaj and Staszic strove for a model of social reform which much more resembled Western bourgeois patterns¹⁶.

It is interesting that in both concepts of political reform women played quite a big role. Both – the more moderate and the radical reformers – reflected on the place of women in their visions of a new society. Count Czartoryski wrote extensively on this topic. He argued that nature had made women equal to men. But he pointed out that women up to the present day had been neglected in the sphere of education. He criticized the image of women, which usually degrades them to mere biological birth givers. In contrast to this picture he demanded them to be mothers, teachers and – most important – citizens: “It seems that women live only to be women; all the other tasks allotted by nature or society pass by them unnoticed. The education of daughters to be good wives, mothers, housewives and citizens – who would dare [to call] for it now?”¹⁷. In his educational program he did not follow Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778), whose

¹⁵ A.K. Czartoryski, *Katechizm rycerski*, ed. and preface H. Mościcki, Warszawa et al. 1925 (Warszawa 1774); id., *Definicje różne przez pytania i odpowiedzi dla Korpusu Kadetów*, Warszawa 1790.

¹⁶ H. Kołłątaj, *O poprawie szkoły kadetów i o wskrzeszeniu milicyi wojewódzkich napisany rok 1784*, [in:] *Listy Anonima i prawo polityczne narodu polskiego*, eds. B. Leśnodorski, H. Wereszycka, Warszawa 1954, vol. 2, p. 341–366; S. Staszic, *Uwagi nad życiem Jana Zamoyskiego (... do dzisiejszego stanu Rzeczypospolitej przystosowane) (1785)*, ed. S. Czarnowski, Wrocław 1952, p. 105–116.

¹⁷ A.K. Czartoryski, *Drugi list JMC Pana Doświadczyńskiego do przyjaciela swego względem edukacji córek*, Warszawa 1781, p. 5 („Zdaie im się, że kobiety na to się tylko rodzą, aby były kobietami; wszystkie zaś inne zamiary, czyli to natury, czyli społeczności, giną niepostrzeżone w ich oczach. Wychowywać córki na żony dobre, na matki, na gospodynie, na obywatelki, komuż teraz na myśli przychodzi?”).

writings otherwise he highly appreciated; indeed quite similar to Rousseau Czartoryski rejected an alleged unnatural and sophisticated education for women¹⁸. But in contrary to Czartoryski Rousseau distinguished a private sphere, where the natural goodness of women provided for the quiet realm of family life, from a public sphere, which was spoiled by political conflicts and quarrels. Czartoryski on the contrary demanded that women just like men should care about the troubles which had befallen the country and criticized them for their mere concentration on household-affairs¹⁹. In a quite similar way argued Staszic and Kołłątaj. The latter did not call for a reinvention of the nobility, but sought instead to build a new stratum of citizens, characterized by virtues and a responsible commitment to the state as the common good. He argued that when one keeps in mind the basic needs of society, it becomes clear that “the mothers of the Republic, the mothers of the knights, the mothers of the landlords and landowners should be as enlightened as possible, they should be of pure morality, they should above all be imbued with love for the liberties of the country – otherwise their offspring will not live up to the demands of the constitution of a free country”²⁰.

In contrast to the above mentioned reformers conservative critiques of political change as for example the nobleman Gabriel Taszycki (1744–1809) blamed women for the decay of morals in the Polish-Lithuanian Republic and for this reason wanted to exclude them from the public life and to restrict their property rights (which by the way were for Polish noblewomen much more advantageous than for women of the same social status in the West). Women should live under the guardianship of men, for they lacked the superior moral qualities which were peculiar to men²¹. In Taszycki’s writings we can find a notion of misogyny not uncommon for the political discourse in other European countries since the Enlightenment. While men were described as gifted with

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 22–26.

¹⁹ For the reception of Rousseau’s writings in Poland *vide* e.g. W. Stetkiewiczówna, *System wychowania kobiet według KEN*, „Przegląd Pedagogiczny”, 1924, vol. 43, no. 4, p. 215–244, here especially p. 225–228 and I. Baklarska, *Matka i opiekunka okresu polskiego oświecenia w świetle poglądów pedagogicznych Franciszka Bielińskiego i Stanisława Staszica*, [in:] *Partnerka, matka, opiekunka. Status kobiety w dziejach nowożytnych od XVI do XX wieku*, ed. K. Jakubiak, Bydgoszcz 2000, p. 83–90.

²⁰ H. Kołłątaj, *Listy Anonima...*, vol. 2, p. 93 („[...] iż matki Rzeczypospolitej, matki stanu rycerskiego, matki gospodarzów i panów powinny być jak najgruntowniej oświecone, powinny być obyczajów nieskażonych, powinny być najpierwej przejęte miłością swobód krajowych, inaczej potomstwo ich nie będzie tym, czym go mieć chce konstytucja wolnego rządu”).

²¹ G. Taszycki, *O własności fortun kobiecych* (Warszawa 1792), [in:] *Kodeks Stanisława Augusta. Zbiór dokumentów*, ed. S. Borowski, Warszawa 1938, p. 96–111, here 98 f.

reason, women seemed to be ruled only by their uncontrolled emotions and for this reason unfit for political decision-making.

Surprisingly in the Polish reform discourse, whose protagonists were well versed in current trends of western political thought, those misogynist aspects seemed to be rather absent. At the end of the 18th century – in view of the state’s downfall – the warlike ideal of the son’s education was replaced by a “patriotic” one. Now emotions began to play an ever greater role in the education and mothers were upgraded as citizens and teachers of future citizens. As Bogna Lorence-Kot has put it: “The new mode of territorial defence was highly emotional – and its agent was the mother, whose duty was to develop and direct feelings”. Femininity and emotions were nothing to be scared of but appreciated as an essential precondition for the education of brave citizens. The new model of education implied “[...] that the incorporation of such traditional female qualities as tenderness and mildness would not destroy men but make them better. In turn, these qualities which emphasized feeling were used to cultivate a strong emotional attachment to the nation”²². In this concept, motherhood had turned into a social or political function and was no longer connected exclusively to the private sphere. It meant also that military virtue was seen as a trait that could only develop through emotion-led education: men weren’t soldiers through their natural inclination for fighting but became soldiers by education.

The revaluation of women as those who had to provide for patriotic citizens eager to engage in military action in behalf of rescuing the state became even more important when in 1794 a military uprising under the leadership of Tadeusz Kościuszko had broken out. The uprising was directed against the Russian and Prussian partitioning powers. In mobilizing more than 100,000 soldiers – noble regiments on the one hand, but also urban and peasant militias on the other – it reached dimensions of modern revolutionary warfare, although the patriotic enthusiasm of the lower classes was by no means general²³. Kościuszko knew that he had to offer a new social program (as well as an invitation for the non-Catholic subjects of the Commonwealth²⁴) in order to raise the number of potential fighters and hence referred to concepts that during the Four-Year-Sejm

²² B. Lorence-Kot, op.cit., p. 6 f.

²³ A. Marcinkowski, *Ogólne zasady organizacji wojska polskiego w latach 1791–1918*, [in:] *Od armii komputowej do narodowej (XVI–XX w.)*, eds. Z. Karpus, W. Rezmer, Toruń 1998, p. 155–170, here especially p. 156 f; M.G. Müller, *Szlachecki czy mieszczański model narodu*, [in:] *Polskie powstania narodowe...*, p. 227–235; T. Kizwalter, *Wzorce społeczeństwa obywatelskiego w polskich powstaniach*, [w:] *Polskie powstania narodowe...*, p. 237–255.

²⁴ J.A. Gierowski, *Udział Żydów w Powstaniu Kościuszkowskim*, [in:] *Powstanie Kościuszkowskie i jego Naczelnik. Historia i tradycja*, ed. T. Kulak, Kraków 1996, p. 41–46.

had been proclaimed by the minority faction of Polish Jacobins who had been opting for the general liquidation of serfdom and for legal equality of peasants and townsmen. Whereas in the Constitution of May 1791 the term “nation” still had referred to the noble part of the society as the political nation, now the status of active citizenship was promised as a reward for participation in the uprising to everybody²⁵. An emotional element that was evident in the political rhetoric should inflame the whole society with patriotism.

In this respect again the social function of women as mothers and citizens played an important role for the rhetoric of the insurgents. During the uprising several proclamations of the newly established Supreme National Council were directed towards Polish women. They were described as an inseparable part of the Polish nation and called upon to aid the insurgents²⁶. This situation was not necessarily perceived as an alleged state of emergency as Karen Hagemann has depicted it for the anti-Napoleonic wars in the German lands, which only exceptionally justified the public engagement of women²⁷. Rather the model of a future society was invoked, where citizenship should be connected with the performance of duty towards the state²⁸. In the proclamations of the council it became clear that active military service was meant to be not the only way to fulfil this duty. But besides this revolutionary notion that was rather directed towards the future, one should also take into account “traditional” gender roles in Polish noble families. Already before the re-evaluation of women in the period of patriotic upheaval noblewomen had been acting on the noble estates as administrators and even legislators. This was the more important as in the Polish-Lithuanian Republic with its lack of institutions representing the central government the noble courts played an important role for the provincial administration. When cultural and political nation-building started in the Polish lands at the end of the 18th century, the lack of a powerful central state and a bourgeois social order

²⁵ J. Kowecki, *The General Levy in Eighteenth Century Poland*, [in:] *East Central European Society and War in the Pre-Revolutionary Eighteenth Century*, eds. B.F. Kiraly, P.F. Sugar, Boulder 1982, p. 189–197; J. Bardach B. Leśnodorski, M. Pietrzak, op.cit., p. 309; J. Staszewski, *Die Polnische Adelsrepublik im 18. Jahrhundert im Licht neuerer Forschungen*, „Zeitschrift für Ostmitteleuropa-Forschung”, 2003, vol. 52, no. 4, p. 572–583, here p. 578 f.

²⁶ Rada Najwyższa Narodowa: Odezwa do obywaterek względem szycia koszul dla wojska. 17. czerwca 1794, Warszawa 1794. („Płci piękna! Od Obywatelstwa nieoddzielna! Ubiegasz się wraz z mężką do trudów i pracy nieusłapiąc iey prawie w niczym”).

²⁷ K. Hagemann, *Female Patriots. Women, war and the nation in the period of Prussian-German Anti-Napoleonic wars*, „Gender and History”, 2004, vol. 16, no. 2, p. 397–424.

²⁸ Skeptical about these alleged intentions is S. Walczewska, *Damy, rycerze, feministki. Kobiety dyskurs emancypacyjny w Polsce*, 2nd edition, Kraków 2000, p. 41 f.

seemed to provide a more comfortable starting point for future female citizens than in allegedly more progressive societies²⁹.

Whereas for example in France extremely complementary gender images seemed to be indispensable for the national-patriotic mobilization, in Poland military mobilization was not grounded on the exclusion of women. As Claudia Opitz has shown for the French revolutionary wars femininity was depicted as something negative, which spoiled the morals of the brotherhood of soldiers. The image of the citizen-soldier (which comprised all males) was opposed to the image of women who were not able to join the army. Through the tight connection of citizenship with military service women were excluded from the public sphere³⁰. In Poland war and alleged female emotionality were intertwined in a more positive way, for only women were held to be able to provide for the needed patriotic mobilization³¹. Whereas in the West hierarchical and complementary gender images were used to strengthen the boundary between the public and the private sphere, in Poland the specific gender roles during the time of the revolutionary warfare in 1794 seems to have made this boundary more permeable.

But as we have a closer look at the texts produced by the Supreme National Council during the ongoing uprising we find a second and perhaps more lasting conceptualization of new social roles. During the uprising we can observe an ever closer stress on the necessity of a strict administration in the countryside in order to secure conscription for the army and the supply of food and uniforms to the troops³². For the first time in Polish history something like a centralized and effective local administration developed. The revolutionary authorities of

²⁹ M. Bogucka, *Białogłowa w dawnej Polsce: kobieta w społeczeństwie polskim XVI–XVIII na tle porównawczym*, Warszawa 1998, p. 7. For the 19th century vide: T. Kizwalter, *Modernization Processes and Emancipation of Women in the Polish Territories in the 19th Century*, „Acta Poloniae Historica”, 1996, vol. 74, p. 91–96.

³⁰ C. Opitz, *Der Bürger wird Soldat – und die Bürgerin...? Die Revolution, der Krieg und die Stellung der Frauen nach 1789*, [in:] ead., *Aufklärung der Geschlechter, Revolution der Geschlechterordnung. Studien zur Politik – und Kulturgeschichte des 18. Jahrhunderts*, Münster 2002, p. 173–198.

³¹ B. Lorence-Kot, op.cit.

³² Vide e.g. Rada Najwyższa Narodowa: Rezolucja względem konskrypcji ludności w mieści Warszawie, Warszawa 1794 (16 czerwca); Rada Najwyższa Narodowa: Organizacja Sądu Najwyższego Kryminalnego, Warszawa 1794 (17 czerwca); Rada Najwyższa Narodowa: Postanowienie dozorów i przepisy dla dozorców i nauczycielach w dozorach, Warszawa 1794 (26 lipca); C. Kraft: *Das „Staatlich-Administrative” als Feld von Aushandlungsprozessen zwischen alten und neuen Eliten Ende des 18. und zu Beginn des 19. Jahrhunderts*, [in:] *Aufsteigen und Obenbleiben in europäischen Gesellschaften des 19. Jahrhunderts. Akteure – Arenen – Aushandlungsprozesse*, eds. K. Holste, D. Hüchtker, M.G. Müller, Berlin 2009, p. 21–47, here especially p. 29–32.

the uprising stressed the importance of discipline not only in the rank and file of the army but also in the everyday-life of the entire population which had to adapt to the requirements of warfare³³. In this situation not the audacious soldier but the sober bureaucrat became the new ideal of republican citizenship and the family with its patriotic education was no longer the main backbone of the state. The “republican mother”³⁴ well-known to us also from the context of the American Revolution remained important but she was joined by the new caste of bureaucrats who often had been recruited from the petty nobility or from the non-noble elites like teachers and clergymen. These newly created administrative elites saw themselves in a quite difficult position. On the one hand they had to adhere to the rhetoric of political liberation and social equality which had been propagated since the beginning of the uprising. On the other hand, the required discipline had to be integrated in this framework³⁵. For this purpose quite often rhetorical patterns of manly self-government were applied which stressed the responsibility each soldier or bureaucrat had to carry. As a consequence no longer patriotic inflammation but sober performance of one’s duty was required. The containment of potential revolutionary chaos by the construction of new societal models was represented by the confrontation of the emotional patriotic education at home and the self-governing agency in the public. This divide should become even more obvious in the following decades.

In the Duchy of Warsaw, which was established in 1807 as a semi-autonomous state on behalf of the French domination of Central Europe, we can observe developments which to a good deal follow the now well established pattern of manly self-government. At first sight the social and political provisions in the Napoleonic era resembled the reform discussion on the eve of the partitions: political participation was connected to property or state-service. Through a powerful and centralized administration until then only theoretically discussed social and political reforms were implemented very quickly in the Polish society of the Duchy. The civil law of the Code Napoleon provided a bourgeois legal order but the constitution rather preserved the former noble character of society³⁶. Before this legal and political background a formerly unknown social dynamic

³³ J. Malec, *Polska myśl administracyjna 18 wieku*, Kraków 1986, p. 122 ff.

³⁴ L.K. Kerber, *The Republican Mother: Women and the Enlightenment – An American Perspective*, „American Quarterly”, vol. 28, Summer 1976, no. 2, p. 187–205; J. Martschukat, *Vaterfigur und Gesellschaftsordnung um 1800*, [in:] *Väter, Soldaten, Liebhaber. Männer und Männlichkeiten in der Geschichte Nordamerikas. Ein Reader*, eds. id., O. Stieglitz, Bielefeld 2007, p. 83–100.

³⁵ A. Cwer, op.cit., p. 79–102.

³⁶ J. Czuby, *Księstwo Warszawskie (1807–1815)*, Warszawa 2011; id., *Zasada...*, p. 298 ff; B. Leśnodorski, *Elementy feudalne i burżuazyjne w ustroju Księstwa Warszawskiego*,

developed and threatened above all the masses of the poorer nobility with social decline³⁷.

In this situation one can observe a growing importance of military service as a way to preserve one's political and social status in the ranks of the formerly at least theoretically equal community of nobles³⁸. But the army of the Duchy comprised only 30.000 soldiers in 1807 (meanwhile growing to 60.000 during the 1809 campaign against Austria), so that neither the rank and file nor the officers who had been mobilized during the Kościuszko uprising and afterwards in the legions of Napoleonic warfare (in the years between 1797 and 1803 about 200,000) could be absorbed³⁹. The problem was by no means a mere quantitative one: while during the uprising and the revolutionary warfare social boundaries had become more permeable, in the Duchy of Warsaw traditional elites were reevaluated. The French government privileged members of distinguished and well off Polish families in order to strengthen the legitimacy of its rule⁴⁰. Besides that the sphere of civil administration developed into a field of social distinction. The growing importance which was attributed to the work in civil and military institutions can be demonstrated by the conflict about the official uniforms for the Duchy's nobility. In 1809 also non-noble civil servants claimed the right to wear uniforms as a reward for their work carried out for the public interest⁴¹. These uniforms can be seen as a symbol stressing the separation of the public from the private sphere, the officials in army and administration from the family as an integral part of the private life. It is no surprise that first of all the petty nobility which feared a decline of its social position stressed the meaning of the uniforms as a means to reevaluate their work in the administration or as soldiers.

„Czasopismo Prawno-Historyczne”, 1951, no. 3, p. 304–332; W. Sobociński, *Historia ustroju i prawa Księstwa Warszawskiego*, Toruń 1964.

³⁷ Ch.A. Blackburn, *Napoleon and the Szlachta*, New York 1998, p. 128 f.

³⁸ J. Czuby, *Warszawa 1806–1815. Miasto i ludzie*, Warszawa 1997, p. 21 ff; C. Kraft, *Polnische militärische Eliten...*, p. 279–285; J. Czuby, *Księstwo...*, p. 235–282.

³⁹ T. Łepkowski, *Polska – narodziny nowoczesnego narodu 1764–1870*, Warszawa 1967, p. 144 f.

⁴⁰ Hence it came to no surprise that conflicts occurred regularly between officers with a background in the legions who often leant to more egalitarian concepts as general Józef Zajęzek (1752–1826) clashed with the more conservative views of members of traditional noble elites as it was the war minister of the Duchy Józef Antoni Poniatowski (1763–1813), vide: J.A. Goclon, *Polska na królu pruskim zdobyta. Ustrój, administracja i sądownictwo doby Komisji Rządzącej w 1807 roku*, Wrocław 1999, p. 145–154; W. Rostocki, *Korpus w gęsie pióra uzbrojony. Urzędnicy warszawscy, ich życie i praca w Księstwie Warszawskim i Królestwie Polskim do roku 1831*, Warszawa 1972, p. 46 f.

⁴¹ J. Jedlicki, *Klejnot i bariery społeczne. Przeobrażenia szlachectwa polskiego w schyłkowym okresie feudalizmu*, Warszawa 1968, p. 228; W. Rostocki, op.cit.

In this way a kind of bourgeois separation of public and private spheres was introduced in the social practices of Polish society. The separation of public and private spheres was additionally reinforced by the fact that the Duchy of Warsaw adopted the highly centralized and bureaucratized system of government that was typical for the “Napoleonic model” – at that time the most advanced model of modern state-building⁴². This model needed well educated bureaucrats that were aware of the legal norms (i.e. above all the Code Napoleon) which now constituted the basis for all kind of social relations. For this reason in 1808 a *Law School* (Szkola Praw) was founded in Warsaw, which had been transformed in 1811 into a *School for Administrative Sciences* (Szkola Nauk Administracyjnych)⁴³. These institutions became the basis for the recruitment of new (male) elites; as a consequence of this professionalization and of the functional differentiation of society a gendering of spheres of activities was enforced. During the Republic of Nobles with its lack of central institutions the noble courts and estates had been important places for political communication in regard to regional affairs but since the second half of the 18th century more and more also for national matters in general. In the parlours of the landed gentry also noble women took part in these elaborations about politics, since there was no clear cut distinction between a private sphere and a political public. With the professionalization of administrating and governing, an exclusive sphere for the new professionals developed which was inaccessible for women, since they couldn't acquire the necessary educational testimonies in the above mentioned institutions. Only by chance they still were part of political conversations: so e.g. when the wife of the prefect of the Duchy of Warsaw, Anna Nakwaska (1781–1851), had to translate the correspondence of his husband with the French office holders since French had been an integral part of female education in noble families⁴⁴.

Besides that the actually “modern” (in socio-economic terms) civil law of the Code Napoleon stressed the male guardianship and submitted the wife entirely the husband's rule⁴⁵. Thereby paradoxically the Code resembled the ideas

⁴² L. Raphael, *Recht und Ordnung. Herrschaft durch Verwaltung im 19. Jahrhundert*, Frankfurt/Main 2000, p. 41–75.

⁴³ B. Leśnodorski, *Szkola Prawa i Nauk Administracyjnych w Księstwie Warszawskim*, [in:] id., W. Sobociński, J. Sawicki, *Studia z dziejów Wydziału Prawa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego*, Warszawa 1963, p. 7–32.

⁴⁴ A. Nakwaska, *Ze wspomnień wojewodziny Nakwaskiej*, „Kronika Rodzinna. Pismo dwutygodniowe poświęcone literaturze, sprawom społecznym i domowym”, 1891, no. 4–6, p. 169–174, 292–297; *Polski Słownik Biograficzny*, vol. 22, Wrocław et al. 1977, p. 476 f.

⁴⁵ Th. Ramm, *Das Familienrecht des Preußischen Allgemeinen Landrechts und des Code Civil im Vergleich*, [in:] *200 Jahre Allgemeines Landrecht für die preußischen Staaten. Wirkungsgeschichte und internationaler Kontext*, eds. B. Dölemeyer, H. Mohnhaupt, Frank-

of male-female relationships which had been present in the thinking of conservative Polish noblemen like the above mentioned Gabriel Taszycki who had ascribed a very similar role to women in his writings and at the same time had firmly rejected any foreign or Western influence on Polish legislation. Interestingly rather “out-dated” persons in the Duchy like the aristocrat Adam Jerzy Czartoryski (1770–1861) renewed in their political thinking in a way the idea of gender equality. He deplored the growing self-interest in the Duchy’s society and the decline of morals and advocated as a remedy a “renaissance of knight-hood”⁴⁶. Thereby women and men should engage in a battle for the positive development of the society. For Czartoryski the “chivalric showground” should be the family as well as the army, the school as well as the administration and he made no distinction between the agency of state officials and of women as teachers. The “family” as one arena where the improvement of the society should start, renewed the high estimation, which the Polish reforms since the late 18th century had allotted to the patriotic education at home. But in the Duchy of Warsaw the main pillars of education had become schools and military academies. Obviously the future did not belong to the conceptions of Czartoryski but rather to the implementation of a complementary gender order according to Western models. These new gender images became even more important since the Duchy of Warsaw with its large amount of soldiers returning from the Polish Legions and from the armies of the partitioning powers quickly adopted the model of an exclusively male brotherhood of citizen-soldiers.

Placing the transformation of gender images in a wider interpretative framework it is remarkable how the discourse about femininity changed in the course of the 19th century. The cult of the Virgin Mary as the patron saint of the Polish nation and as an allegory of Polish womanhood, which had become an increasingly important commonplace during the 19th century was scarcely to be found in the reform discussions at the end of the 18th century. In this discourse a flood of publications had appeared in which the military bravery of women in earlier times (above all during the battles against the Cossacks or Turkish invaders in the 17th century) was praised and contrasted with the passivity of the noble knights. A classic narrative was that about female patriots as e.g. the famous Zofia Chrzanowska who with her heroic resistance had allegedly saved the

fur/Main 1995, p. 463–483; B. Dölemeyer, *Frau und Familie im Privatrecht des 19. Jahrhunderts*, [in:] *Frauen in der Geschichte des Rechts. Von der Frühen Neuzeit bis zur Gegenwart*, ed. U. Gerhard, München 1997, p. 633–658.

⁴⁶ A.J. Czartoryski, *O rycerstwie*, [in:] *Droga do niepodległości czy program defensywny? Praca organiczna: Programy i motywy*, eds. T. Kizwalter, J. Skowronek, Warszawa 1988, p. 79–83.

fortress Trembowla from the Turks in 1675⁴⁷. In 1792 an account of this event ended with the integration of Polish women into the community of Polish citizens: “The whole nations crowns your name and your soul, and above all two of them shall be honoured in spite of the sacrifices you had to make, namely as the mother of the head of the citizens and the good son of the fatherland as well as the wife of the patriot”⁴⁸. In this vein Chrzanowska clearly was characterized as an important ingredient of the nation in distress as a mother and as a wife, not only in a mere “private” function but in regard to patriotism and heroism, both unthinkable without her commitment. Such a perspective seems to be symptomatic for the 18th century when gender first and foremost had been related to the “social space, to the net of social relations and aims”, as Ute Frevert has put it⁴⁹, and not related to a matrix of seemingly fixed biological attributes.

During the 19th century the discourse about femininity changed seriously and focused on a specific aspect of female heroism. According to Brian Porter the popularity of the Virgin Mary can be described as an example to combine “[...] two distinct strains of Polish national thought: one focused on maintaining conservative gender relations and the other on attaining victory in the international realm”⁵⁰. Until the beginning of the 19th century the military aid provided by the Virgin Mary and in a figurative sense by the Polish women played a more important role than the maternal aid. This changed obviously during the 19th century, when we can observe an increasing mystification of women as “spiritual mothers” of the Polish nation, who were morally important but more and more excluded from political agency. The observation that women during the time of revolutionary warfare and patriotic mobilization were important for the nation but not for the state seems to fit not only cases when a state, a nation-state already existed as was the case in France but also for the Polish society that had lost its state at the end of the 18th century. Therefore it seems to be appropriate to relate gender images and gender roles not only to the processes of nation-building but

⁴⁷ For the historical figure *vide*: *Polski Słownik Biograficzny*, vol. 3, Kraków 1937, p. 458.

⁴⁸ *Wzór dla Polek w osobie Kazanowskiej wstawionej męstwem przy dobytciu Trębowli*, [without place] 1792, p. 104 f. („Cały Naród wasze uwieńcza imiona i Dusze, a na ich czele dwie nayznakomitsze, które procz osobiście poczynionych ofiar, tym są zaszczycone, iż jedna jest Głowy Obywatelstwa, i dobrego Oyczyzny Syna Matką, druga pierwszego Patryoty Zona”).

⁴⁹ U. Frevert, *Geschlecht – männlich/weiblich. Zur Geschichte der Begriffe 1730–1990*, [in:] id., „*Mann und Weib, und Weib und Mann*”, *Geschlechterdifferenzen in der Moderne*, München 1995, p. 13–60, here p. 27 („der soziale Raum, das Netz sozialer Beziehungen und Zwecke”).

⁵⁰ B. Porter, *Hetmanka and Mother: Representing the Virgin Mary in Modern Poland*, „*Contemporary European History*”, 2005, vol. 14, no. 2, p. 151–170, here p. 153.

also to those of state-building. In the Polish case, were a political nation (of nobles) already existed before the period of revolutionary warfare, the impact of a renewed gender order seemed to be more important in the field of creating new state institutions as an army and an effective administration.

During the 19th century (above all after the failed insurrections in 1830 and 1863) we can find a kind of reinterpretation of female and male agency. Indeed already in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth – in view of the relatively weak central institutions and at the same time of the significance of the regional noble estates – the family and here especially the mothers were regarded as eminently important for the education of future citizens, as it had been demonstrated by the writings of the reformers. After the destruction of the state via the partitions this educational task was even more enhanced, since the upbringing of children was believed to be especially important for the preserving or shaping a national identity in a society without a state⁵¹. Polish political elites were aware of the relevance female education had in this context and already during the first decades of the 19th century efforts were made to improve and to standardize the contents and forms of education for girls. But at the same time an instruction for the education of women published in the 1820^s in the Kingdom of Poland shows that women should acquire above all the skills that would be useful in the domestic sphere; any profound scientific knowledge was not requested, even more, it was believed not to be appropriate to the character of women⁵². Polish female historians already in the interwar period had noticed this conservative roll-back in educational matters and assumed that it had its roots not least in the plans of the “National Commission of Education” (KEN) which had stipulated to clearly segregate the education of boys and girls⁵³.

Another feature of the 19th century was that females acting in the public sphere became more and more suspect, female transgressors of the public-private boundary had to be “re-socialized” – a finding which can be proved by the

⁵¹ D. Rzepnewska, *Women of the Landowning Class in the Polish Kingdom during the 19th Century*, „Acta Poloniae Historica”, 1996, vol. 74, 97–120; A. Winiarz, *Wpływ kobiety-matki na życie polskiej rodziny ziemiańskiej doby niewoli narodowej, 1795–1918*, [in:] *Partnerka, matka, opiekunka...*, p. 146–155.

⁵² *Wychowanie Kobiet. Urządzenie Instytutu Wychowania Płci Żeńskiej, dn. 22 listopada 1826*, [in:] *Zbiór Przepisów Administracyjnych Królestwa Polskiego*, Warszawa 1866, Wydział Oświecenia, 5, p. 357–383, quoted after: *Przemiany społeczne i gospodarcze w Królestwie Polskim 1815–1830*, ed. S. Kieniewicz, Warszawa 1951, p. 427–431.

⁵³ Ł. Charewiczowa, *Kobieta w dawnej Polsce do okresu rozbiorów*, Poznań 2002 (published first in Lwów 1938), p. 101 f; W. Stetkiewiczówna, *System wychowania kobiet według KEN*, „Przegląd Pedagogiczny”, 1924, vol. 43, no. 4, p. 215–244, here especially p. 229–232.

reading of innumerable works of fictional literature⁵⁴. At the latest after the cancellation of the January uprising in 1863 the image of the *matka-spartanka* was replaced by that of the *matka-Polka*. Once again it is worth to integrate Polish history into a broader European perspective. A decisive factor for the reshaping of gender relations during the 19th century had been the introduction of modern civil codes around 1800 not only in France with the code Napoleon (1804) but also in Prussia (1794) and in Austria (1801): through these codifications, which became relevant for the Polish society as part of the system of domination of the partitioning powers, the private sphere had been fixed as distinctively separated from the public one. Via legislation male authority in the family was assured and hence also in the Polish lands the discourse of (gender) equality – inherent to the thinking in categories of natural law during the 18th century – was replaced with a legal thinking that in regard to gender relations rather operated with “eternal” truths and “natural” principles⁵⁵. In this vein it contributed to the consolidation of a discourse about the allegedly immutable characters of the sexes.

In this new matrix of gender relations manly roles also varied a lot: it was no longer the vigorous warrior whose heroic fight during the uprisings or in the Napoleonic Legions tried to liberate the fatherland but the disciplined soldier or rational bureaucrat who created through the everyday practice of the so called organic work (*praca organiczna*) the framework for the new Polish state. The adherents of the concept of the organic work pointed at the creation of a well-educated and hard-working society, imbued with the virtue of industry as an indispensable prerequisite for a progressive development of the Polish nation. Such a picture contrasted sharply with the romantic glorification of exceptional heroism during the national uprisings. New concepts of masculinities and femininities become especially manifest in the writings of the National Democracy (*endecja*) whose members were critical about the “effeminate” character of the Republic of Nobles, which they juxtaposed a modern national community characterized by virtues as rationality, solidarity, and not least national egoism⁵⁶. In a gender perspective it is interesting to see how prominent members of this

⁵⁴ M. Janion, *Kobieta i duch inności*, Warszawa 1996, p. 54–59; H. Filipowicz, *Othering the Kosciuszko-Uprising: Women as Problem in Polish Insurgent Discourse*, [in:] *Studies in Language, Literature, and Cultural Mythology in Poland. Investigating „The Other”*, ed. E.M. Grossman, Lewiston 2002, p. 55–83; id., *The Daughters of Emilia Plater*, [in:] *Engendering Slavic Literatures*, eds. P. Chester, S. Forrester, Indiana 1996, p. 34–58.

⁵⁵ B. Dölemeyer, op.cit., p. 633–658.

⁵⁶ C. Kraft, *Gendering Polish Historiography of the Late 18th and 19th Centuries*, [in:] *Gendering Historiography: Beyond National Canons*, eds. A. Epple, A. Schaser, Frankfurt/Main 2009, p. 78–101, especially p. 95–97.

political formation like for example its leading ideologue Zygmunt Balicki (1858–1916) characterized such a modern nation. According to him it should be comprised of “soldier-citizens” (*żołnierzy-obywatele*), whose description again profited a lot from the (implicit) use of gender differences. Some quotations from Balicki’s book *National Egoism in View of Ethics* (1902) may underline this observation: “A soldier is strong already by the nature of his handicraft, and physical strength effectively influences a man’s character. Vigour of the body goes along, as everybody knows, with the spirit’s firmness, and the healthier and stronger the body the more the spirit will be able to govern the body. Regarding these commonplaces in our midst strange prejudices can be heard, that very often equate physical strength with brutality, yet normally strong people used to be decent, whereas only the undisciplined nerves of a deformed body tends to brutality; intellectualism, the cult of one’s own soul, exaggerated sensitivity and emotionality are regarded as proof for a mental superiority, but these are just signs of an insane neurosis”⁵⁷. What kind of role should women play in this community of citizen-soldiers? Balicki admits that “Women with a knightly spirit did not miss in our history, even in the latest time, as long as effeminacy, softness of character and exaggerated spiritual sensitiveness were not made into guiding principles in education for men as well as for women”⁵⁸. In an annotation the author concedes that soldier-like education could also be appropriate for women. But the example he refers to sees the “real military service for women” (*prawdziwa służba wojskowa dla kobiet*) in a “department for domestic economy” (*zakład gospodarstwa domowego*)⁵⁹. The exclusive re-location of women to household affairs and the negative evaluation of “exaggerated spiritual sensi-

⁵⁷ Z. Balicki, *Narodowy egoizm wobec etyki*, 2nd edition, Lwów 1903, p. 86f. („Żołnierz jest silnym już z natury swego rzemiosła, a siła fizyczna wpływa rozstrzygająco na charakter człowieka. Krzepkość ciała idzie, jak wiadomo, w parze z jędrnością ducha, a im ciało zdrowsze i silniejsze, tem większe duch ma nad nim władze. Na punkcie pewników tak utartych i niezbitych, panują u nas najdziwaczniejsze przesady i utożsamia się często siłę fizyczną z brutalnością, tymczasem ludzie silni bywają zazwyczaj dobrymi zarazem, w brutalności celują tylko rozpasane nerwy zwyrodniałego ciała; intelektualizm, kult własnej duszy, nadmierne wrażliwość i czułośćkowość poczytuje się za oznaki wyższości duchowej, gdy są to tylko objawy chorobliwej nerwicy”).

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 90 („Kobiet rycerskiego ducha nie brakło w naszych dziejach, nawet najnowszych, dopóki zniewieściałość, miękość charakteru i przeczulenie duchowe nie zostały podniesione do godności wskazań w wychowaniu i w życiu i to zarówno dla mężczyzn jak dla kobiet”).

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, note 1 („Że wychowanie żołnierskie może być dla kobiet odpowiednie, świadczy zakład gospodarstwa domowego generałowej Zamoyskiej w Zakopanem. Zastosowane do zajęć najbardziej niewieścich, jest on jednak prawdziwą «służbą wojskową dla kobiet», jak się sama założycielka wyraża”).

tiveness” in Balicki’s text written at the beginning of the 20th century sharply contrasts with the positive assessment of emotion-led education depicted as women’s genuine contribution to the resurrection of the Polish state after the partitions. The clear distinction made by Balicki between male and female spheres of action (army respectively department for domestic economy) and above all his praise of the sane, disciplined male body shows a clear differentiation between public and private spheres and what seems to be even more important a naturalization of social functions of men and women, which had become attached to the body.

In following the Polish discourses about the reform and re-building of state institutions since the late 18th century I have depicted the relevance of gender-related images for the justification of social change. Whereas for the final phase of the Commonwealth and also in the period of revolutionary warfare certain permeability between public and private spheres had been stated, these spheres became ever more distinct in regard to male and female agency during the 19th century. The same is true for the evaluation of emotions: emotionality was qualified as positive in regard to the education of future soldiers and citizens as well as in regard to the patriotism and heroism that should inflame the Polish fighters for independence. During the time of partitions new concepts of socially adequate behaviour and gender roles were developing: at the end of the 19th century dying for the nation was no longer the key attribute of masculinity but working in the public sphere that was ever more divided from the private one as well as from the memory of the former state and the former uprising. Only in these two latter spheres – the private sphere and the sphere of collective memory – femininity now played an important role, whereas it was excluded from the “political” realm of sober bureaucrats and disciplined soldiers. Modeled on the Virgin Mary, women received their social position “by transmitting feminine virtues to an overly masculine modernity”⁶⁰.

⁶⁰ B. Porter, *op.cit.*, p. 160.

